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Abstract
Weighted voting is a classic model of cooperation among agents in decision-making
domains. In such games, each player has a weight, and a coalition of players wins the
game if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. A player’s power in such games
is usually not directly proportional to his weight, and is measured by a power index, the
most prominent among which are the Shapley–Shubik index and the Banzhaf index.
In this paper, we investigate by how much a player can change his power, as measured
by the Shapley–Shubik index or the Banzhaf index, by means of a false-name manipulation,
i.e., splitting his weight among two or more identities. For both indices, we provide upper
and lower bounds on the effect of weight-splitting. We then show that checking whether
a beneficial split exists is NP-hard, and discuss efficient algorithms for restricted cases of
this problem, as well as randomized algorithms for the general case. We also provide an
experimental evaluation of these algorithms.
Finally, we examine related forms of manipulative behavior, such as annexation, where
a player subsumes other players, or merging, where several players unite into one. We
characterize the computational complexity of such manipulations and provide limits on
their effects. For the Banzhaf index, we describe a new paradox, which we term the
Annexation Non-monotonicity Paradox.
1. Introduction
Collaboration and cooperative decision-making are important issues in many types of in-
teractions among self-interested agents (Ephrati & Rosenschein, 1997). In many situations,
agents must take a joint decision leading to a certain outcome, which may have a different
impact on each of the agents. A standard and well-studied way of doing so is by means
of voting, and in recent years, there has been a lot of research on applications of voting to
multiagent systems as well as on computational aspects of various voting procedures (see
Faliszewski & Procaccia, 2010). One of the key issues in this domain is how to measure
the power of each voter, i.e., his impact on the final outcome. In particular, this question
becomes important when the agents have to decide how to distribute the payoffs resulting
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from their joint action: a natural approach would be to pay each agent according to his
contribution, i.e., his voting power.
This issue is traditionally studied within the framework of weighted voting games (WVGs)
(Taylor & Zwicker, 1999), which provide a model of decision-making in many political and
legislative bodies (Leech, 2002; Laruelle & Widgren, 1998; Algaba, Bilbao, & Ferna´ndez,
2007), and have also been investigated in the context of multiagent systems (Elkind, Gold-
berg, Goldberg, & Wooldridge, 2008b, 2007). In such a game, each of the agents has a
weight, and a coalition of agents wins the game if the sum of the weights of its participants
meets or exceeds a certain quota. There are numerous examples of multiagent systems that
can be captured by weighted voting games. For example, the agents’ weights may corre-
spond to the amount of resources (time, money, or battery power) that they contribute, and
the quota may indicate the amount of resources needed to complete a given task. Alterna-
tively, the weight may be an indicator of an agent’s experience or seniority, and a voting
procedure may be designed to take into account these characteristics.
Clearly, having a larger weight makes it easier for a player to affect the outcome. How-
ever, the player’s power is not always proportional to his weight. For example, if the quota
is so high that the only winning coalition is the one that includes all players, intuitively,
all players have equal power, irrespective of their weight. This idea is formalized using the
concept of a power index, which is a systematic way of measuring a player’s influence in a
weighted voting game. There are several ways to define power indices. One of the most pop-
ular approaches relies on the fact that weighted voting games form a subclass of coalitional
games, and therefore one can use the terminology and solution concepts that have been
developed in the context of general coalitional games. In particular, an important notion
in coalitional games is that of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), which is a classic method
of distributing the gains of the grand coalition in general coalitional games. The Shapley
value has a natural interpretation in the context of weighted voting, where it is known as
the Shapley–Shubik power index (Shapley & Shubik, 1954). Another well-known power
index, which has been introduced specifically in the context of weighted voting games, is
the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf, 1965). While several other power indices have been proposed
(e.g., see Johnston, 1978; Deegan & Packel, 1978; Holler & Packel, 1983), the Shapley–
Shubik power index and the Banzhaf power index are usually viewed as the two standard
approaches to measuring the players’ power in weighted voting games, and have been widely
studied from both normative and computational perspective.
As suggested above, power indices measure the players’ power and can be used to de-
termine their payoffs. However, to be applicable in real-world scenarios, this approach to
payoff division has to be resistant to dishonest behavior, or manipulation, by the partici-
pating players. In this paper we study the effects of a particular form of manipulation in
weighted voting games, namely, false-name voting. Under this manipulation, a player splits
his weight between himself and a “fake” agent who enters the game. Such manipulations are
virtually impossible to detect in open anonymous environments such as the internet. They
can also occur in legislative bodies, where political parties vote on bills. In such bodies,
elections are held every several years to determine the weight each party has when voting
on a bill. Before such elections are held, a party may split up into two smaller parties. It is
likely that the supporters of that party would somehow split between the two new parties,
so the total weight of the new parties will be equal to that of the original party. By choosing
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a suitable platform, the original party can decide how the weight would be split between
the two new parties.
While a weight-splitting manipulation does not change the total weight of all identities
of the cheating agent, his power (as measured by the Shapley–Shubik power index or the
Banzhaf index) may change. Therefore, this behavior presents a challenge to the designers
of multiagent systems that rely on weighted voting. The main goal of this paper is to
measure the effects of false-name voting and analyze its computational feasibility. We also
examine the related scenarios of players merging in order to increase their joint power, or
one player annexing another one.
Our main results are as follows:
• We precisely quantify the worst-case effect of false-name voting on agents’ payoffs.
Namely, we show that in an n-player game splitting into two false identities can
increase an agent’s payoff by at most a factor of 2 both for the Shapley–Shubik index
and the Banzhaf index. Moreover, this bound is asymptotically tight. On the other
hand, we show that false-name manipulation can decrease an agent’s payoff by at
most a factor of Θ(n) for both indices.
• We demonstrate that finding a successful manipulation is not a trivial task by proving
that for both indices it is NP-hard to verify if a beneficial split exists. However, we
show that if all weights are polynomially bounded, the problem can be solved in
polynomial time, and discuss efficient randomized algorithms for this problem.
• We present similar NP-hardness results for the case of players merging into a single
new player. Interestingly, in the case of a player annexing one or more players, there
is a contrast between the Shapley–Shubik index and the Banzhaf index. Whereas for
the Shapley–Shubik index, annexing is always beneficial, checking whether annexing
is beneficial in the case of the Banzhaf index is NP-hard. However it is beneficial if a
player annexes a player with a bigger weight. We also present a new paradox called
The Annexation Non-monotonicity Paradox, which shows that annexing a “small”
player can be more useful than annexing a “big” player.
• We complement our theoretical results by experiments which indicate the expected
fractions of positive and negative false-name manipulations in weighted voting games
with randomly selected weights.
1.1 Related Work
Weighted voting games date back at least to John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern,
who developed their theory in their monumental book Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Subsequently, WVGs have been analyzed
extensively in the game theory literature (see, for instance, Taylor & Zwicker, 1999).
In his seminal paper, Shapley (1953) considered coalitional games and the question of fair
allocation of the utility gained by the grand coalition. The solution concept introduced in
this paper became known as the Shapley value of the game. The subsequent paper (Shapley
& Shubik, 1954) studies the Shapley value in the context of simple coalitional games, where
it is usually referred to as the Shapley–Shubik power index. The Banzhaf power index was
59
Aziz, Bachrach, Elkind, & Paterson
originally introduced by Banzhaf (1965); a somewhat different definition was later proposed
by Dubey and Shapley (1979). In this paper, we make use of Banzhaf’s original definition,
as it is more appropriate in the context of payoff division.
Both of these power indices have been well studied. Straffin (1977) shows that each index
reflects certain conditions in a voting body. Laruelle (1999) describes certain axioms that
characterize these two indices, as well as several others. These indices were used to analyze
the voting structures of the European Union Council of Ministers and the IMF (Machover
& Felsenthal, 2001; Leech, 2002).
The applicability of the power indices to measuring political power in various domains
has raised the question of finding tractable ways to compute them. However, this problem
appears to be computationally hard. Indeed, the naive algorithm for calculating the Shapley
value (or the Shapley–Shubik power index) considers all permutations of the players and
hence runs in exponential time. Moreover, Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (1994) show
that computing the Shapley value in weighted voting games is #P-complete. This result
is extended by Matsui and Matsui (2001), who show that calculating the Banzhaf index
in weighted voting games is also NP-hard. Furthermore, Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra
(2009) show that comparing the player’s power in two different weighted voting games is
PP-complete for both indices.
Despite these hardness results, several papers show how to compute these power indices
in some restricted domains, or discuss ways to approximate them. These include a generating
functions approach (Mann & Shapley, 1962), which trades required storage for running time,
Owen’s multilinear extension (MLE) approach (Owen, 1975) and Monte Carlo simulation
approaches (Mann & Shapley, 1960; Fatima, Wooldridge, & Jennings, 2007; Bachrach,
Markakis, Resnick, Procaccia, Rosenschein, & Saberi, 2010). Matsui and Matsui (2000)
provide a good survey of algorithms for calculating power indices in weighted voting games.
Many of these approaches work well in practice, which justifies the use of these indices as
payoff distribution schemes in multiagent domains.
As a useful and succinct model for coalitional voting games, WVGs have attracted
a lot of interest from the multiagent community. A number of papers have considered
the problem of designing WVGs with desirable properties (Aziz, Paterson, & Leech, 2007;
Fatima, Wooldridge, & Jennings, 2008; de Keijzer, Klos, & Zhang, 2010). Simple games
that can be obtained by combining multiple weighted voting games have been examined by
Elkind et al. (2008b) and Faliszewski, Elkind, and Wooldridge (2009). Another well-studied
topic is computing various stability-related solution concepts in WVGs and their extensions
(Elkind et al., 2007; Elkind & Pasechnik, 2009; Elkind, Chalkiadakis, & Jennings, 2008a).
False-name manipulations in open anonymous environments have been examined in
different domains such as auctions (Yokoo, 2007; Iwasaki, Kempe, Saito, Salek, & Yokoo,
2007) and coalitional games (Yokoo, Conitzer, Sandholm, Ohta, & Iwasaki, 2005; Ohta,
Iwasaki, Yokoo, Maruono, Conitzer, & Sandholm, 2006; Ohta, Conitzer, Satoh, Iwasaki, &
Yokoo, 2008). In the latter domain, the characteristic function by itself does not provide
enough information to analyze false-name manipulation. To deal with this issue, Yokoo
et al. (2005) introduced a framework where each player has a subset of skills, and the
characteristic function assigns values to the subset of skills. Our model can be seen as a
special case of this framework; however, due to special properties of weighted voting games
we are able to obtain much stronger results than in the general case.
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The phenomenon considered in the paper has been studied by political scientists and
economists under the name of “the paradox of size” (Shapley, 1973; Brams, 1975; Felsenthal
& Machover, 1998); however, neither its quantitative nor its computational aspects have
been considered. Felsenthal and Machover also discuss a number of other paradoxes in
weighted voting games; Laruelle and Valenciano (2005) give an overview of more recent
work on paradoxes of weighted voting. Occurrences of these paradoxes in voting bodies are
considered by Kilgour and Levesque (1984),van Deemen and Rusinowska (2003), and Leech
and Leech (2005). Another form of manipulation in WVGs has been recently studied by
Zuckerman, Faliszewski, Bachrach, and Elkind (2008), who analyze how the center might
change the players’ power by modifying the quota even if the weights are fixed.
1.2 Follow-up Work
Many results that appear in this paper have been previously presented at the AAMAS con-
ference (Bachrach & Elkind, 2008; Aziz & Paterson, 2009). Inspired by this work, Lasisi
and Allan (2010) have recently undertaken an experimental analysis of false-name manip-
ulations in weighted voting games. They have also considered less popular power indices,
such as the Deegan–Packel index. In another follow-up paper, Rey and Rothe (2010) inves-
tigate false-name manipulations in weighted voting games with respect to the probabilistic
Banzhaf index, i.e., the one suggested by Dubey and Shapley (1979). Although the prob-
abilistic Banzhaf index is more useful for measuring the actual probability of influencing a
decision, it does not fit the framework of using power indices to share resources or power,
because the probabilistic Banzhaf index is not normalized.
2. Preliminaries and Notation
We start by introducing the notions that will be used throughout this paper.
2.1 Coalitional Games
A coalitional game G = (N, v) is given by a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, and a characteris-
tic function v : 2N → R, which maps any subset, or coalition, of players to a real value. This
value is the total utility these players can guarantee to themselves when working together.
A coalitional game G = (N, v) is called monotone if v(S) ≤ v(T ) for any S ⊆ T . Further,
G is called simple if it is monotone and v can only take values 0 and 1, i.e., v : 2N → {0, 1}.
In such games, we say that a coalition S ⊆ N wins if v(S) = 1, and loses if v(S) = 0. A
player i is critical, or pivotal, for a coalition S if adding this player to S turns it from a
losing coalition into a winning coalition: v(S) = 0, v(S ∪ {i}) = 1. A player i is a veto
player if he is necessary for forming a winning coalition, i.e., v(S) = 0 for any S ⊆ N \ {i}
(for monotone games, this is equivalent to requiring v(N \ {i}) = 0).
2.2 Weighted Voting Games
A weighted voting game G is a simple game that is described by a vector of players’ weights
w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ (R+)n and a quota q ∈ R+. We write G = [q;w1, . . . , wn], or G = [q;w].
In these games, a coalition is winning if its total weight meets or exceeds the quota. Formally,
for any S ⊆ N we have v(S) = 1 if ∑i∈S wi ≥ q and v(S) = 0 otherwise. We will often
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write w(S) to denote the total weight of a coalition S, i.e., w(S) =
∑
i∈S wi. Also, we set
wmax = maxi=1,...,n wi. We will make the standard assumption that w(N) ≥ q, i.e., the
grand coalition is winning. Note that if q = w(N), then any player i ∈ N is a veto player.
2.3 Power Indices
For each player, both her Shapley–Shubik index and her Banzhaf index are determined
by this player’s expected marginal contribution to all possible coalitions; however, the two
indices make use of different probabilistic models.
The Shapley–Shubik index is a specialization of Shapley value—a classic solution concept
for coalitional games—to simple games. In more detail, let Πn be the set of all possible
permutations (orderings) of n players. Each π ∈ Πn is a one-to-one mapping from {1, . . . , n}
to {1, . . . , n}. Denote by Sπ(i) the set of predecessors of player i in π, i.e., Sπ(i) = {j |
π(j) < π(i)}. The Shapley value of the i-th player in a game G = (N, v) is denoted by
ϕi(G) and is given by the following expression:
ϕi(G) =
1
n!
∑
π∈Πn
[v(Sπ(i) ∪ {i})− v(Sπ(i))]. (1)
We will occasionally abuse notation and say that a player i is pivotal for a permutation π
if it is pivotal for the coalition Sπ(i).
The Shapley–Shubik power index is simply the Shapley value in a simple coalitional
game (and therefore in the rest of the paper we will use these terms interchangeably). In
such games the value of each coalition is either 0 or 1, so formula (1) simply counts the
fraction of all orderings of the players in which player i is critical for the coalition formed
by his predecessors. The Shapley–Shubik power index thus reflects the assumption that
when forming a coalition, any ordering of the players entering the coalition has an equal
probability of occurring, and expresses the probability that player i is critical.
In contrast, the Banzhaf index computes the probability that the player is critical under
the assumption that all coalitions of the players are equally likely. Formally, given a game
G = (N, v), for each i ∈ N we denote by ηi(G) the number of coalitions for which i is
critical in a game G. The Banzhaf index of a player i in a WVG G = (N, v) is
βi(G) =
ηi(G)∑
j∈Nηj(G)
.
While there exist several other approaches to determining the players’ influence in a
game, the Shapley–Shubik index and the Banzhaf index have many useful properties that
make them very convenient to work with. We will make use of three of these properties,
namely, the normalization property, the symmetry property, and the dummy player prop-
erty. The normalization property simply states that the sum of Shapley–Shubik indices (or
Banzhaf indices) of all players is equal to 1. The symmetry property says that two players
i, j that make the same contribution to any coalition, i.e., such that v(S ∪{i}) = v(S ∪{j})
for any S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, have equal values of the index. The dummy player property claims
that for a dummy player both indices equal 0, where a player i is called a dummy if he
contributes nothing to any coalition, i.e., for any S ⊆ N we have v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S). It
is easy to verify from the definitions that both the Shapley–Shubik index and the Banzhaf
index have these properties.
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3. Weight-Splitting: Examples
In real-world situations modeled by weighted voting games, players may be able to split,
dividing their resources (weight) arbitrarily among the new identities. The payoff would
then be distributed among the agents according to their power in the resulting game. In-
tuitively, the total payment obtained by the new identities should be equal to the payoff
of the original player before the split. However, we will now demonstrate that this is not
the case if the payoff is distributed according to either the Shapley–Shubik index or the
Banzhaf index.
We first show that players can use weight-splitting to increase their power.
Example 1. [Advantageous splitting] Consider the WVG [6; 2, 2, 2]. By symmetry,
each player has a Banzhaf index of 1/3, and a Shapley–Shubik index of 1/3. If the last
player splits up into two players, the new game is [6; 2, 2, 1, 1]. In this game, just as in the
original game, the only winning coalition is the grand coalition, and hence all players are
equally powerful. Thus, the split-up players have a Banzhaf index of 1/4 each, as well as a
Shapley–Shubik index of 1/4 each, i.e., weight-splitting increases the manipulator’s power
by a factor of (2 · 1/4)/(1/3) = 3/2 according to both indices.
However, weight-splitting may also be harmful.
Example 2. [Disadvantageous splitting] Consider the WVG [5; 2, 2, 2]. Again, by sym-
metry, each player has a Banzhaf index of 1/3, and a Shapley–Shubik index of 1/3. If
the last player splits up into two players, the new game is [5; 2, 2, 1, 1]. Each of the new
players is pivotal for exactly one coalition, while each of the players of weight 2 is pivotal
for three coalitions. Thus, the new players have a Banzhaf index of 1/8 each. Similarly,
each of the new players is pivotal for a permutation if and only if it appears in the third
position, followed by the other new player, i.e., the new players have Shapley–Shubik index
of 2/24 = 1/12. Thus, weight splitting decreases the player’s power by a factor of 4/3
according to the Banzhaf index and by a factor of 2 according to the Shapley–Shubik index.
Finally, weight-splitting may have no effect on the player’s power.
Example 3. [Neutral splitting] Consider the WVG [4; 2, 2, 2]. As in the previous exam-
ples, by symmetry, each player has a Banzhaf index of 1/3, and a Shapley–Shubik index
of 1/3. If the last player splits up into two players, the new game is [4; 2, 2, 1, 1]. In this
game, each of the new players is pivotal for 2 coalitions, while each of the players of weight
2 is pivotal for 4 coalitions. Thus, the split-up players have a Banzhaf index of 1/6 each.
Similarly, each of the new players is pivotal for a permutation if and only if it appears in
the third position, followed by one of the players of weight 2. There are exactly 4 such
permutations, so the Shapley–Shubik index of each of the new players is 1/6. We have
2 · 1/6 = 1/3, i.e., according to both indices, the player’s total power did not change.
In all examples presented so far, weight-splitting had the same effect on the Shapley–
Shubik index and the Banzhaf index of the manipulator. We will now show that this is not
always the case.
Example 4. Consider the WVG [5; 2, 1, 1, 1, 1]. In this game, the first player is pivotal for a
permutation if he appears in the last or second-to-last position, but not in earlier positions.
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Thus, his Shapley–Shubik index is 2/5. Further, this player is pivotal for any coalition that
contains three or four players of weight 1, i.e., for 5 coalitions. On the other hand, any
player of weight 1 is pivotal for any coalition that contains the player of weight 2 as well as
any two other players of weight 1, i.e., for 3 coalitions. Thus the Banzhaf index of the first
player is given by 5/(5 + 4 · 3) = 5/17.
Now, if the first player splits into two players of weight one, in the resulting game all
players have the same weight. Therefore, for each of them the value of both indices is 1/6,
and hence the total power of the manipulator is 1/3.
It remains to observe that 2/5 > 1/3, but 5/17 < 1/3, i.e., weight-splitting hurts the
manipulator if the payoff is distributed according to the Shapley–Shubik index, but helps
him if the Banzhaf index is used. Further, this example can be generalized to any weighted
voting game of the form [n; 2, 1, . . . , 1], where there are n− 1 players of weight 1 and n ≥ 5:
in any such game, weight-splitting lowers the payoff of the first player according to the
Shapley–Shubik index from 2n to
2
n+1 , but increases his payoff according to the Banzhaf
index from n
(n−1)2+1 to
2
n+1 .
4. Splitting: Bounds of Manipulation
We have seen that a player can both increase and decrease his total payoff by splitting his
weight. In this subsection, we provide upper and lower bounds on how much he can change
his payoff by doing so. We restrict our attention to the case of splitting into two identities;
the general case is briefly discussed in Section 9.
To simplify notation, in the rest of this section we assume that in the original game
G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] the manipulator is player n, and he splits into two new identities n′ and
n′′, resulting in a new game G′. We first consider the case of the Shapley–Shubik index,
followed by the analysis for the Banzhaf index.
4.1 Shapley–Shubik Index
We start by providing a tight upper bound on the benefits of manipulation.
Theorem 5. For any game G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] and any split of n into n′ and n′′, we have
ϕn′(G′) + ϕn′′(G′) ≤ 2nn+1ϕn(G), i.e., the manipulator cannot gain more than a factor of
2n/(n+ 1) < 2 by splitting his weight between two identities. Moreover, this bound is tight,
i.e., there exists a game in which player n increases his payoff by a factor of 2n/(n+ 1) by
splitting into two identities.
Proof. Fix a split of n into n′ and n′′. Let Πn−1 be the set of all permutations of the first
n − 1 players. Consider any π ∈ Πn−1. Let P (π) be the set of all permutations of the
players in G′ that can be obtained by inserting n′ and n′′ into π. Let Π∗n+1 be the set of all
permutations π∗ of players in G′ such that n′ or n′′ is pivotal for π∗. Finally, let P ∗(π, k)
be the subset of P (π) ∩ Π∗n+1 that consists of all permutations π′ ∈ P (π) in which at least
one of the players n′ and n′′ appears between the k-th and the (k + 1)-st element of π′ and
is pivotal for π′. Every permutation in Π∗n+1 appears in one of the sets P ∗(π, k) for some
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π, k, so we have
ϕn′(G′) + ϕn′′(G′) =
|Π∗n+1|
(n + 1)!
≤ 1
(n + 1)!
∑
π,k
|P ∗(π, k)|.
On the other hand, it is not hard to see that |P ∗(π, k)| ≤ 2n for any π, k: there are two
ways to place n′ and n′′ between the k-th and the (k+1)-st element of π, n−1 permutations
in P ∗(π, k) in which n′ appears after the k-th element of π, but n′′ is not adjacent to it,
and n − 1 permutations in P ∗(π, k) in which n′′ appears after the k-th element of π, but
n′ is not adjacent to it. Moreover, if P ∗(π, k) is not empty, then n is pivotal for the
permutation f(π, k) obtained from π by inserting n after the k-th element of π. Further, if
(π1, k1) 	= (π2, k2) then f(π1, k1) 	= f(π2, k2). Hence,
ϕn(G) ≥ 1
n!
∑
π,k:P ∗(π,k) =∅
1 ≥ 1
n! · 2n
∑
π,k
|P ∗(π, k)| ≥ n + 1
2n
(ϕn′(G′) + ϕn′′(G′)).
We conclude that ϕn′(G′) + ϕn′′(G′) ≤ 2nn+1ϕn(G) ≤ 2ϕn(G), i.e., the manipulator cannot
gain more than a factor of 2n/(n + 1) < 2 by splitting his weight between two identities.
To see that this bound is tight, consider the game G = [2n; 2, 2, . . . , 2] and suppose that
one of the players (say, n) decides to split into two identities n′ and n′′ resulting in the game
G′ = [2n; 2, . . . , 2, 1, 1]. In both games the only winning coalition consists of all players, so we
have ϕn(G) = 1/n, ϕn′(G′) = ϕn′′(G′) = 1/(n+1), i.e., ϕn′(G′)+ϕn′′(G′) = 2nn+1ϕn(G).
We have seen that no player can increase his payoff by more than a factor of 2 by
splitting his weight between two identities. In contrast, we will now show that a player can
decrease his payoff by a factor of Θ(n) by doing so. This shows that a would-be manipulator
has to be careful when deciding whether to split his weight, and motivates the algorithmic
questions studied in the next two sections.
Theorem 6. For any game G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] and any split of n into n′ and n′′, we have
ϕn′(G′) + ϕn′′(G′) ≥ n+12 ϕn(G), i.e., the manipulator cannot lose more than a factor of
(n + 1)/2 by splitting his weight between two identities. Moreover, this bound is tight,
Proof. To prove the first part of the theorem, fix a split of n into n′ and n′′ and consider
any permutation π of players in G such that n is pivotal for π. It is easy to see that at
least one of n′ and n′′ is pivotal for the permutation f(π) obtained from π by replacing
n with n′ and n′′ (in this order). Similarly, at least one of n′ and n′′ is pivotal for the
permutation g(π) obtained from π by replacing n with n′′ and n′ (in this order). Moreover,
all such permutations of players in G′ are distinct, i.e., for any π, π′ we have g(π) 	= f(π′),
and π 	= π′ implies f(π) 	= f(π′), g(π) 	= g(π′). Hence, if Π∗n is the set of all permutations
π of the players in G such that n is pivotal for π, and Π∗n+1 is the set of all permutations π
of the players in G′ such that n′ or n′′ is pivotal for π, we have |Π∗n+1| ≥ 2|Π∗n| and
ϕn′(G′) + ϕn′′(G′) =
|Π∗n+1|
(n + 1)!
≥ 2|Π
∗
n|
(n + 1)!
=
2
n + 1
ϕn(G).
To see that this bound is tight, consider the game G = [2n − 1; 2, 2, . . . , 2] and suppose
that one of the players (say, n) decides to split into two identities n′ and n′′ resulting in
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the game G′ = [2n − 1; 2, . . . , 2, 1, 1]. In the original game G, the only winning coalition
consists of all players, so we have ϕn(G) = 1/n. Now, consider any permutation π of
the players in G′. We claim that n′ is pivotal for π if and only if it appears in the n-th
position of π, followed by n′′. Indeed, if π(n′) = n, π(n′′) = n + 1, then all players in the
first n − 1 positions have weight 2, so w(Sπ(n′)) = 2n − 2, w(Sπ(n′) ∪ {n′}) = 2n − 1.
Conversely, if π(n′) = n + 1, we have w(Sπ(n′)) = 2n − 1 = q, and if π(n′) ≤ n − 1,
we have w(Sπ(n′) ∪ {n′}) ≤ 2(n − 1). Finally, if π(n′) = n, but π(n′′) 	= n + 1, we have
w(Sπ(n′)∪{n′}) = 2n−2 < q. Consequently, n′ is pivotal for (n−1)! permutations, and, by
the same argument, n′′ is also pivotal for (a disjoint set of) (n− 1)! permutations. Hence,
we have ϕn′(G′) + ϕn′′(G′) =
2(n−1)!
(n+1)! =
2
n+1ϕn(G).
4.2 Banzhaf Index
For the Banzhaf index, we can obtain similar bounds on the maximum gains and losses
from a weight-splitting manipulation.
Theorem 7. For any game G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] and any split of n into n′ and n′′, we have
βn′(G′) + βn′′(G′) ≤ 2βn(G). Moreover, this bound is asymptotically tight.
Proof. Assume that player n splits up into n′ and n′′ and that wn′ ≤ wn′′ . Consider a losing
coalition C for which n is critical in G. Then w(C) < q ≤ w(C) +wn = w(C) +wn′ +wn′′ .
We have the following possibilities:
• q − w(C) ≤ wn′ . In this case n′ and n′′ are critical for C in G′.
• wn′ < q − w(C) ≤ wn′′ . In this case n′′ is critical for C ∪ {n′} and C in G′.
• q −w(C) > wn′′ . In this case n′ is critical for C ∪ {n′′} and n′′ is critical for C ∪ {n′}
in G′.
Therefore we have ηn′(G′) + ηn′′(G′) = 2ηn(G) in each case.
Now consider a player i ∈ N \ {n}. Suppose that i is critical for a coalition C in G. If
n ∈ C, then i is also critical for the coalition C ′ = C \ {n} ∪ {n′, n′′} in G′. On the other
hand, if n 	∈ C, then i also remains critical for C in G′. Hence ηi(G) ≤ ηi(G′). Moreover,
i may also be critical for some coalitions in G′ that contain just one of n′ and n′′, so the
above inequality will not in general be an equality. Thus, we have
βn′(G′) + βn′′(G′) =
2ηn(G)
2ηn(G) +
∑
i∈N\{n} ηi(G′)
≤ 2ηn(G)
2ηn(G) +
∑
i∈N\{n} ηi(G)
≤ 2ηn(G)
ηn(G) +
∑
i∈N\{n} ηi(G)
= 2βn(G).
To see that this bound is tight, consider a WVG G = [n− 1; 1, . . . , 1, 2] with n players.
We have ηn(G) = n− 1 +
(
n−1
2
)
and ηi(G) = 1 +
(
n−2
2
)
for i 	= n. Therefore,
βn(G) =
n− 1 + (n−12 )
n− 1 + (n−12 )+ (n− 1)(1 + (n−22 )) =
n
n2 − 4n + 8 ∼ 1/n.
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If player n splits up into two players n′ and n′′ with weights 1 each, then in the resulting
game G′ the Banzhaf index of each player is 1n+1 . Thus for large n, βn′(G
′) + βn′′(G′) =
2
n+1 ∼ 2βn(G).
We can also bound the damage that can be incurred by weight-splitting.
Theorem 8. For any game G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] and any split of n into n′ and n′′, we have
βn′(G′) + βn′′(G′) ≥ 1nβn(G).
Proof. Suppose that player n splits into two players n′ and n′′ with weights wn′ and wn′′ ,
respectively. We assume without loss of generality that wn′ ≤ wn′′ . Now, consider an
arbitrary player i 	= n, and let
Ti = {S ⊆ N \ {i} | w(S) < q,w(S) + wi ≥ q},
Si = {S ⊆ N \ {n, i} ∪ {n′, n′′} | w(S) < q,w(S) + wi ≥ q}.
We have ηi(G) = |Ti|, ηi(G′) = |Si|. Further, set
S1i = {S ∈ Si | i is pivotal for S \ {n′, n′′}},
S2i = {S ∈ Si | i is not pivotal for S \ {n′, n′′} and n′ ∈ S, n′′ 	∈ S},
S3i = {S ∈ Si | i is not pivotal for S \ {n′, n′′} and n′′ ∈ S, n′ 	∈ S},
S4i = {S ∈ Si | i is not pivotal for S \ {n′, n′′} and n′, n′′ ∈ S}.
We claim that Si = ∪4j=1Sji . Indeed, if S 	∈ S1i , then i is pivotal for S, but not for S\{n′, n′′},
and hence it must be the case that S∩{n′, n′′} 	= ∅; all such sets are included in S1i ∪S2i ∪S3i .
For any S ∈ Si, let f(S) = S \ {n′, n′′}, g(S) = S \ {n′, n′′} ∪ {n}. If S ∈ S1i , then
f(S) ∈ Ti, and for each set T ∈ Ti there are at most 4 sets S such that f(S) = T , i.e.,
|f−1(T )| ≤ 4. Further, S ∈ S4i implies g(S) ∈ Ti, and |g−1(T )| ≤ 1 for any T ∈ Ti. Finally,
we have g(S′) 	= f(S′′) for any S′, S′′ ∈ Si. Taken together, these observations imply that
|S1i |+ |S4i | ≤ 4|Ti| = 4ηi(G).
Now, consider an S ∈ S2i . We have w(S) < q, w(S) + wi < q, w(S) + wi + wn′ ≥ q.
Hence, n′ is critical for S ∪{i}. Similarly, if S ∈ S3i , it follows that n′′ is critical for S ∪{i}.
Therefore, we have |S2i |+ |S3i | ≤ ηn′(G′) + ηn′′(G′). We obtain
ηi(G′) = |Si| ≤
4∑
j=1
|Sji | ≤ 4ηi(G) + ηn′(G′) + ηn′′(G′) = 4ηi(G) + 2ηn(G),
where the last equality follows from the proof of Theorem 7. Thus, we obtain
βn′(G′) + βn′′(G′) =
2ηn(G)
2ηn(G) +
∑
i∈N\{n} ηi(G′)
≥ 2ηn(G)
2ηn(G) + 4
∑
i∈N\{n} ηi(G) + 2(n− 1)ηn(G)
≥ 2ηn(G)
2n
∑
i∈N ηi(G)
=
βi(G)
n
.
67
Aziz, Bachrach, Elkind, & Paterson
While it is not clear if the bound given in Theorem 8 is tight, our next example shows
that splitting into two players can decrease a player’s payoff according to the Banzhaf index
by a factor of almost
√
n
2π .
Example 9. Consider a WVG G = [3k; 1, . . . , 1, 4k] with n = 2k players. Let N1 be the
set of all players of weight 1, i.e., N1 = {1, . . . , n − 1}. It is easy to see that player n is
critical for any coalition, while all other players are dummies, so we have βn(G) = 1. Now
suppose that player n splits up into new identities n′ and n′′ with weights wn′ = wn′′ = 2k.
For player n′ to be critical for a coalition S in G′, it has to be the case that either n′′ 	∈ S,
k ≤ |S ∩N1| ≤ n− 1 or n′′ ∈ S, 0 ≤ |S ∩N1| ≤ k − 1. Thus, we have
ηn′(G′) = ηn′′(G′) =
n∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
= 2n−1.
Moreover, for a player i with weight 1 to be critical for a coalition in G′, the coalition must
include exactly one of n′ or n′′ as well as k− 1 of the n− 2 other players in N1 \ {i}. Thus,
we have ηi(G′) = 2
(
2k−2
k−1
)
for i < n. Using the standard formulas for the asymptotics of the
central binomial coefficient, we can approximate 2
(
2k−2
k−1
)
by 2
√
2
π(2k−1)4
k−1. We obtain
βn′(G′) + βn′′(G′) ≈ 2 · 2
n−1
2n−1 + 2n−1 + (n− 1)
√
2
π(n−1)2
n−1
=
2
2 +
√
n− 1
√
2
π
∼
√
2π
n
.
5. Complexity of Finding a Beneficial Split
We now examine the problem of finding a beneficial weight split in weighted voting games
from the computational perspective. Ideally, the manipulator would like to find a payoff-
maximizing split, i.e., a way to split his weight among two or more identities that results
in the maximal total payoff. A less ambitious goal is to decide whether there exists a
manipulation that increases the manipulator’s payoff. However, it turns out that even this
problem is computationally hard. In the rest of the section, we show that checking whether
there exists a payoff-increasing split is NP-hard both for the Shapley–Shubik index and the
Banzhaf index; this holds even if the player is only allowed to use two identities. That is,
in the spirit of the groundbreaking papers of Bartholdi and Orlin (1991) and Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick (1989, 1992), we show that computational complexity acts as a barrier to
manipulative behavior.
To formally define our computational problems, we require that all weights and the
quota of both the original game and the new game are integers given in binary, i.e., we
only allow integer splits. We remark that this assumption is not entirely without loss of
generality: there are games where a player can benefit from a fractional split more than
from any integer split. One such example is given by the game [3; 1, 1, 1], where there
are no non-trivial integer splits available to the players, but, similarly to Example 1, each
player can increase his power by a factor of 3/2 by splitting into two players with weight
1/2. However, in real-life settings there is usually a natural bound on the granularity of
the weights: if the weight is the number of supporters of a given party, it needs to be an
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integer, and if it is the monetary contribution of a player, it usually has to be an integer
number of dollars (or, at least, cents), i.e., our assumption reflects real-life constraints.
We are now ready to define our problems.
Name: Beneficial-SS-Split
Instance: (G, ) where G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] is a weighted voting game and  ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Question: Is there a way for player  to split his weight w between sub-players 1, . . . , m
so that in the new game G′ it holds that
∑m
j=1 ϕj (G
′) > ϕ(G)?
The definition of Beneficial-BI-Split is similar.
Name: Beneficial-BI-Split
Instance: (G, ) where G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] is a weighted voting game and  ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Question: Is there a way for player  to split his weight w between sub-players 1, . . . , m
so that in the new game G′ it holds that
∑m
j=1 βj (G
′) > β(G)?
Note that we are looking for a strictly beneficial manipulation, i.e., one that increases
the manipulator’s total payoff, rather than one that is simply not harmful.
We will prove that Beneficial-SS-Split and Beneficial-BI-Split are NP-hard. Our
hardness results are based on reductions from the following classic NP-hard problem:
Name: Partition
Instance: A set of k integer weights A = {a1, . . . , ak}.
Question: Is it possible to partition A into two subsets P1 ⊆ A, P2 ⊆ A so that P1∩P2 = ∅,
P1 ∪ P2 = A, and
∑
ai∈P1 ai =
∑
ai∈P2 ai?
We will first prove a simple lemma that will be used in all NP-hardness proofs in this
paper.
Lemma 10. Let A = {a1, . . . , ak} be a “no”-instance of Partition. Then for any weighted
voting game G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] such that n > k, wi = 8ai for i = 1, . . . , k, q = 4
∑
ai∈A ai+
r, where 0 < r < 4, and
∑n
i=k+1 wi < 4, it holds that all players k + 1, . . . , n are dummies,
and hence their Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices are equal to 0.
Proof. Consider a player i with k < i ≤ n and a set S ⊆ N \ {i}. We will show that i is
not pivotal for S.
Set N0 = {1, . . . , k} and let S0 = S ∩ N0. The set N0 can be partitioned into two
equal-weight subsets if and only if A can, so either w(S0) < w(N0)/2, or w(S0) > w(N0)/2.
Moreover, the weights of all players in N0 are multiples of 8, so w(N0)/2 is a multiple of 4.
Similarly, the weight of S0 is a multiple of 8. Hence, if w(S0) < w(N0)/2, it follows that
w(S0) ≤ w(N0)/2− 4 and w(S ∪ {i}) < w(N0)/2− 4+ 4 < q. Therefore, we have v(S) = 0,
v(S ∪ {i}) = 0, i.e., i is not pivotal for S. On the other hand, if w(S0) > w(N0)/2, then
w(S0) ≥ w(N0)/2 + 4 > q, so S0 is a winning coalition. Therefore, i is not pivotal for S in
this case as well.
Theorem 11. Beneficial-BI-Split is NP-hard, and remains NP-hard even if the player
can only split into two players with equal weights.
Proof. Given an instance of Partition A = {a1, . . . , ak}, we construct a weighted voting
game G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] with n = k + 1 players as follows. We let X =
∑
ai∈A ai, and set
wi = 8ai for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, wn = 2, and q = 4X + 2. Also, we set  = n. Since wn = 2,
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the only integer split available to player n is into two identities n′ and n′′ with weight 1
each. Let G′ = [q;w1, . . . , wn−1, 1, 1] be the resulting game.
If A is a “no”-instance of Partition, then Lemma 10 implies that player n is a dummy,
and, moreover, if he splits into sub-players, these sub-players are also dummies. Therefore
(G, ) is a “no”-instance of Beneficial-BI-Split.
Now let us assume that A is a “yes”-instance of Partition. Let x denote the number
of coalitions in N \ {n} of weight 4X. Then ηn(G) = x. For i = 1, . . . , n− 1, let
Si = {S ⊆ N \ {n, i} | w(S) < 4X,w(S) + wi ≥ q},
and set yi = |Si|. Also, set y =
∑n−1
i=1 yi.
Consider a player i < n. Observe that exactly half of the x subsets of {1, . . . , n− 1} of
weight 4X contain i. For any such subset T , player i is pivotal for (T \ {i})∪{n}. Further,
for any coalition S ∈ Si, player i is pivotal for both S and S ∪ {n}. Therefore for i < n we
have ηi(G) = x2 + 2yi. We obtain
βn(G) =
x
x + (n− 1)x2 + 2y
.
On the other hand, in the new game G′ we have ηn′(G′) = ηn′′(G′) = x. Moreover, for
i < n we have ηi(G′) = x2 + 4yi, since each coalition in Si corresponds to 4 coalitions for
which i is pivotal, namely, S, S ∪ {n′}, S ∪ {n′′}, and S ∪ {n′, n′′}. Thus,
βn′(G′) + βn′′(G′) =
2x
2x + (n− 1)x2 + 4y
> βn(G),
where the last inequality holds since x > 0. Thus, a “yes”-instance of Partition corre-
sponds to a “yes”-instance of Beneficial-BI-Split.
We now consider the problem of finding a beneficial split for the Shapley–Shubik index.
Theorem 12. Beneficial-SS-Split is NP-hard, and remains NP-hard even if the player
can only split into two players with equal weights.
Proof. Given an instance A = {a1, . . . , ak} of Partition, we set X =
∑
ai∈A ai, and create
a weighted voting game G = [4X +3; 8a1, . . . , 8ak, 1, 2] with n = k+2 players. Also, we set
N0 = {1, . . . , n− 2}.
If A is a “no”-instance of Partition, then Lemma 10 implies that player n is a dummy,
and if he splits into several players, all of them will be dummies, too. Thus, we have
constructed a “no”-instance of Beneficial SS-Split.
Now, suppose that A is a “yes”-instance of Partition. Let 〈P1, P2〉 be a partition of
A, so w(P1) = w(P2). It corresponds to a partition 〈S,N0 \ S〉 of N0, where i ∈ S if and
only if ai ∈ P1; observe that w(S) = w(N0 \ S). Set s = |S|, so |N0 \ S| = n− s− 2.
It is easy to see that n is critical for S ∪{n− 1} as well as for (N0 \S)∪{n− 1}. There
are (s+1)!(n− 2− s)! permutations of 1, . . . , n that put n directly after some permutation
of S ∪{n−1}. Similarly, there are s!(n−1− s)! permutations putting n directly after some
permutation of (N0 \ S) ∪ {n− 1}. Thus, for each partition P i = 〈P i1, P i2〉, where |P i1| = s,
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we have at least (s+1)!(n−2− s)!+ s!(n−1− s)! distinct permutations where n is critical.
On the other hand, as argued above, if S is a subset of N0 such that w(S) 	= w(N0)/2,
then n is not critical for S or S ∪ {n − 1}, since either w(S) ≤ w(N0)/2 − 4 < q − 3 or
w(S) ≥ w(N0)/2 + 4 > q.
Let P be the set of all partitions of A, where each partition is counted only once, i.e.,
P contains exactly one of the 〈P1, P2〉 and 〈P2, P1〉. For each P i = 〈P i1, P i2〉 ∈ P, we denote
|P i1| = si. There is a total of n! permutations of players in G. Thus, the Shapley–Shubik
index of n in G is
ϕn(G) =
∑
P i∈P
(si + 1)!(n− 2− si)! + si!(n− 1− si)!
n!
=
∑
P i∈P
si!(n− 2− si)!(si + 1 + n− 1− si)
n!
=
∑
P i∈P
nsi!(n− 2− si)!
n!
=
∑
P i∈P
si!(n− 2− si)!
(n− 1)! .
We now consider what happens when n splits into two players, n′ and n′′ with wn′ =
wn′′ = 1, resulting in a game G′ = [4X + 3; 8a1, . . . , 8ak, 1, 1, 1].
Again, let 〈P1, P2〉, |P1| = si, |P2| = n−si, be a partition of A such that w(P1) = w(P2),
and let 〈S,N0 \ S〉 be the corresponding partition of N0. There are (si + 2)!(n − 2 − si)!
permutations that place n′′ directly after some permutation of S ∪ {n − 1, n′}, and n′′ is
critical for each of them. Similarly, n′′ is critical for the si!(n− si)! permutations that place
n′′ directly after some permutation of (N0 \ S) ∪ {n− 1, n′}.
Thus, each partition P i = 〈P i1, P i2〉 with |P i1| = si, corresponds to (si + 2)!(n − 2 −
si)! + si!(n − si)! distinct permutations where n′′ is critical. By symmetry, there are (si +
2)!(n − 2 − si)! + si!(n − si)! distinct permutations where n′ is critical. There are n + 1
players in G′, so there is a total of (n+1)! permutations of the players. Thus each partition
P i = 〈P i1, P i2〉, |P i1| = si, contributes si!(n−2−si)!(n−1)! to the Shapley–Shubik index of n in G, and
2 (si+2)!(n−2−si)!+si!(n−si)!(n+1)! to the sum of the Shapley–Shubik indices of n
′ and n′′ in G′. We
will now show that for any partition P i
2
(si + 2)!(n− 2− si)! + si!(n− si)!
(n + 1)!
>
si!(n− 2− si)!
(n− 1)! . (2)
Summing these inequalities over all partitions P i implies ϕn′(G′) + ϕn′′(G′) > ϕn(G), as
desired. To prove inequality (2), note that it can be simplified to
2
(s + 1)(s + 2) + (n− 1− s)(n− s)
n(n + 1)
> 1,
where we use s instead of si to simplify notation, or, equivalently,
2(s + 1)(s + 2) + 2(n− 1− s)(n− s)− n(n + 1) > 0.
Now, observe that
2(s + 1)(s + 2) + 2(n− 1− s)(n− s)− n(n + 1) = (n− 2− 2s)2 + n > 0
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for any n > 0. This proves inequality (2) for any n > 0. It follows that if A is a “yes”-
instance of Partition, player n always gains by splitting into two players of weight 1, i.e.,
(G,n) is a “yes”-instance of Beneficial-SS-Split.
Remark 13. It can be verified that both of our proofs go through even if we allow non-
integer splits, i.e., our hardness results are independent of the integrality assumption. Fur-
ther, note that we have not shown that Beneficial-BI-Split and Beneficial-SS-Split
are in NP, i.e., we have not proved that these problems are NP-complete. There are two
reasons for this. First, if we allow splits into an arbitrary number of identities, some of the
candidate solutions may have exponentially many new players (e.g., a player with weight
wi can split into wi players of weight 1). Second, even if we circumvent this issue by only
considering splits into a polynomial number of identities, it is not clear how to verify in
polynomial time whether a particular split is beneficial. In fact, since computing both power
indices in weighted voting games is #P-hard, it is quite possible that our problems are not
in NP.
6. Computing Beneficial Splits
In Section 5, we have shown that it is hard even to test if any beneficial split exists, let alone
to find the optimal split. This can be seen as a positive result, since complexity of finding
beneficial splits serves as a barrier for this kind of manipulative behavior. However, it turns
out that in many cases manipulators can overcome the problem. More precisely, in what
follows we show that in certain restricted domains manipulators can find beneficial splits
into two identities in polynomial time. We then consider manipulation algorithms that work
by approximating the Shapley–Shubik index (rather than calculating it precisely).
6.1 Examples
In this subsection, we describe two scenarios in which one of the players can always increase
his payoff by splitting. While both of our examples rely on rather severe constraints on the
players’ weights and the threshold, there are practical weighted voting scenarios that satisfy
these constraints.
Example 14. It is not hard to see that Example 1 can be generalized to any weighted
voting game with w(N) = q; such games are sometimes called unanimity games. Even
more generally, a player can always increase his payoff by weight-splitting if the threshold
is set so high that any winning coalition must include all players; this holds both for the
Shapley–Shubik index and the Banzhaf index. Indeed, consider the class of weighted voting
games G = [q;w] that is characterized by the following condition: w(N) − s < q ≤ w(N),
where s = min{mini wi, wmax/2}. The condition s ≤ mini wi ensures that all players are
present in all winning coalitions, so the index value of each player is 1/n. Now, suppose that
the player i with the largest weight wi = wmax splits his weight (almost) equally between
two identities, i.e., sets w′i = wi/2, w′′i = wi/2. As we also have s ≤ wmax/2, any
winning coalition still has to include all players. Therefore, in the new game the payoff of
each player is 1/(n + 1), and hence the split increases the total payoff of the manipulator
by a factor of 2n/(n + 1).
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Example 15. Our second example is specific to the Shapley–Shubik index. In this example,
a “small” player can benefit from manipulation in the presence of “large” players, as long
as the threshold is sufficiently high. Formally, consider the class of weighted voting games
of the form G = [q;w], where all wi, i = 1, . . . , n− 1, are multiples of some integer A, the
threshold q is of the form AT + b, b < A, and b < wn < min{2b − 1, A}. Suppose that all
winning coalitions have size at least n/2 + 1. This condition holds if we renumber the
players so that w1 ≥ w2 ≥ · · · ≥ wn−1 and require q >
∑
i=1,...,n/2	 wi.
Now, suppose that player n is pivotal for at least one coalition in this game (if all weights
are small multiples of A, this condition can be checked easily). Consider any permutation
π such that n is pivotal for π. We have w(Sπ(n)) = AT . Indeed, if w(Sπ(n)) > AT , then
w(Sπ(n)) ≥ AT + A > q, and the coalition Sπ(n) does not need player n to win. On the
other hand, if w(Sπ(n)) < AT , then w(Sπ(n)) ≤ AT −A, so w(Sπ(n)) +wn < AT + b = q.
Let P be the set of all such permutations; we have ϕn(G) =
|P |
n! .
Now suppose that n decides to split its weight between two new identities n′ and n′′
by setting w′n = b − 1, w′′n = wn − b + 1; note that w′n, w′′n < b. Consider any permutation
π. Suppose that n occurs in the k-th position in this permutation. By our assumption,
k ≥ n/2+ 1. We will construct 2k permutations π′j , π′′j , j = 1, . . . , k, as follows. In each
of these permutations, players 1, . . . , n− 1 appear in the same order as in π. Moreover, in
π′j , player n
′ occurs in the j-th position, and player n′′ occurs in the (k + 1)-st position.
Similarly, in π′′j , player n
′′ occurs in the j-th position, and player n′ occurs in the (k+1)-st
position.
Observe that n′′ is pivotal for any π′j , j = 1, . . . , k. Indeed, the total weight of all players
that precede n′′ in π′j is AT+w
′
n < q, while w(Sπ′j (n
′′)∪{n′′}) > q. Similarly, w(Sπ′′j (n′)) < q,
so n′ is pivotal for any π′′j , j = 1, . . . , k. Hence, the total number of permutations of
1, . . . , n− 1, n′, n′′ for which either n′ or n′′ is pivotal is at least 2k|P | ≥ (n+2)|P |, and the
total Shapley–Shubik index of these players is at least (n+2)|P |(n+1)! >
|P |
n! = ϕn(G). Hence, any
such split is strictly beneficial for player n.
In addition to the scenarios discussed above, Fatima et al. (2007) describe several classes
of voting games where the Shapley–Shubik indices of all players can be computed in poly-
nomial time; Aziz and Paterson (2008) prove similar results for the Banzhaf index. Clearly,
if the manipulator’s weight is polynomially bounded, and the original game as well as all
games that result from the manipulator splitting into two identities are “easy”, i.e., belong
to one the classes considered by Fatima et al. or Aziz and Paterson, the problem of finding
the beneficial two-way split can be solved in polynomial time. However, our examples illus-
trate that a player may be able to decide whether it is beneficial to split even if he cannot
compute his payoff prior to the manipulation.
6.2 Pseudopolynomial and Approximation Algorithms
The hardness reductions in Section 5 are from Partition. While this problem in known
to be NP-hard, its hardness relies crucially on the fact that the weights of the elements
are represented in binary. Indeed, if the weights are given in unary, there is a dynamic
programming-based algorithm for this problem that runs in time polynomial in the size of
the input (such algorithms are usually referred to as pseudopolynomial). In particular, if
all weights are polynomial in n, the running time of this algorithm is polynomial in n. In
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many natural voting domains the weights of all players are not too large, so this scenario
is quite realistic. It is therefore natural to ask if there exists a pseudopolynomial algorithm
for the problem of finding a beneficial split.
It turns out that the answer to this question is indeed positive as long as there is a
constant upper bound K on the number of identities that the manipulator can use and
all weights are required to be integers. To see this, recall that there is a pseudopolyno-
mial algorithm for computing the Shapley–Shubik index of any player in a weighted voting
game (Matsui & Matsui, 2000). This algorithm is based on dynamic programming: for any
weight W and any 1 ≤ k ≤ n, it calculates the number of coalitions of size k that have
weight W . Thus, it can be easily adapted to work for the Banzhaf index as well.
One can use the algorithm of Matsui and Matsui (2000) to find a beneficial split for a
player i with weight wi in a game G as follows. Consider all possible splits wi = w
(1)
i +
· · · + w(K)i , where w(j)i ∈ N for j = 1, . . . ,K. The number of such splits is at most (wi)K ,
which is polynomial in n for constant K. Evaluate the Shapley–Shubik indices (respectively,
Banzhaf indices) of all new players in any such split and return “yes” if and only if at least
one of these splits results in an increased total payoff. Let A(G) be the running time of
the algorithm of Matsui and Matsui on instance G. The running time of our algorithm is
O((wi)KK ·A(G)), which is clearly pseudopolynomial.
We will now consider a more general setting, where only the weight of the manipulator
is polynomially bounded, while the weights of other players can be large. To simplify the
presentation, we limit ourselves to the case of two-way splits and the Shapley–Shubik index;
however, our approach also applies to splits into any constant number of identities and to
the Banzhaf index. We can use the same high-level approach as in the previous case, i.e.,
considering all possible splits (because of the weight restriction, there are only polynomially
many of them), and computing the indices of both new players for each split. However, if
we were to implement the latter step exactly, it would take exponential time. Therefore,
in this version of our algorithm, we replace the algorithm of Matsui and Matsui with an
approximation algorithm for computing the Shapley–Shubik index. Several such algorithms
are known; see, e.g., the work of Mann and Shapley (1960), Fatima et al. (2007), Bachrach
et al. (2010). We will use these algorithms in a black-box fashion. Namely, we assume
that we are given a procedure Shapley(G, i, δ, ) that for any given values of  > 0 and
δ > 0 outputs a number v that with probability 1− δ satisfies |v − ϕi(G)| ≤  and runs in
time poly(n logwmax, 1/, 1/δ). We will now show how to use this procedure to design an
algorithm for finding a beneficial split and relate the performance of our algorithm to that
of Shapley(G, i, δ, ).
Our algorithm is given in Figure 1. It takes parameters δ and  as inputs, and uses the
procedure Shapley(G, i, δ, ) as a subroutine. The algorithm outputs “yes” if it finds a split
whose total estimated payoff exceeds the payoff of the manipulator in the original game by
at least 3. It can easily be modified to output the (approximately) optimal split.
Proposition 16. With probability 1− 3δ, the output of our algorithm satisfies the follow-
ing: (i) If the algorithm outputs “yes”, then (G, i) admits a beneficial integer split; (ii)
Conversely, if there is an integer split that increases the payoff to the manipulator by more
than 6, our algorithm outputs “yes”. Moreover, the running time of our algorithm is
polynomial in nwi, 1/, and 1/δ.
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FindSplit(G = [q;w], i, δ, );
v∗ =Shapley(G, i, δ, );
for j = 0, . . . , wi
w′i = j, w
′′
i = wi − j;
G′ = [q;w1, . . . , wi−1, w′i, w
′′
i , wi+1, . . . , wn];
v′ = Shapley(G′, i′, δ, ), v′′ =Shapley(G′, i′′, δ, );
v = v′ + v′′;
if v > v∗ + 3 then return yes;
return no;
Figure 1: Algorithm FindSplit(G = [q;w], i, δ, )
Proof. Suppose that the algorithm outputs “yes”. Consider the quantities v∗, v′ and v′′
computed by our algorithm. We have Prob[v∗ < ϕi(G)− ] < δ, Prob[v′ > ϕi′(G′)+ ] < δ,
Prob[v′′ > ϕi′′(G′) + ] < δ. Hence, with probability at least 1 − 3δ, if v′ + v′′ > v∗ + 3,
then ϕi′(G) + ϕi′′(G′) + 2 > ϕi(G)−  + 3, or, equivalently, ϕi′(G′) + ϕi′′(G′) > ϕi(G).
Conversely, suppose that there is a beneficial split of the form (w′i, w
′′
i ) that improves
player i’s payoff by at least 6. As before, with probability at least 1 − 3δ we have that
v∗ ≤ ϕi(G)+  and at the step j = w′i it holds that v′ ≥ ϕi′(G′)− , v′′ ≥ ϕi′′(G′)− . Then
v = v′ + v′′ ≥ ϕi′(G′) + ϕi′′(G′) − 2 > ϕi(G) + 6 − 2 ≥ v∗ + 3, so the algorithm will
output “yes”.
While our algorithm does not guarantee finding a successful manipulation, it is possible
to control the approximation quality (at the cost of increasing the running time), so that a
successful manipulation is found with high probability.
Thus we can see that manipulators have several ways to overcome the computational
difficulty of finding the optimal manipulation. Hence, other measures are required to avoid
such manipulations.
7. Merging and Annexation
Instead of a player splitting into smaller players, some players may merge into a single
entity. However, this situation is very different from the game-theoretic perspective, as it
involves coordinated actions by several would-be manipulators who then have to decide how
to split the (increased) total payoff. For the case of players merging to gain advantage, we
examine two cases. One is annexation where one player takes the voting weight of other
players. The annexation is advantageous if the payoff of the new merged coalition in the
new game is greater than the payoff of the annexer in the original game. The other case is
voluntary merging where players merge to become a bloc so that their new payoff exceeds
the sum of their individual payoffs.
For any weighted voting game G, we denote the game that results from merging of the
players in a coalition S by G&S ; the set of players in the new game is (N \S)∪{&S}, and its
characteristic function is denoted by v&S . We will now define the computational problems
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of checking whether there exist a beneficial voluntary merge or annexation with respect to
the Shapley–Shubik index.
Name: Beneficial-SS-Merge
Instance: (G,S) where G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] is a weighted voting game and S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}.
Question: If coalition S merges to form a new game G&S , is ϕ&S(G&S) >
∑
i∈S ϕi(G)?
Name: Beneficial-SS-Annexation
Instance: (G,S, i) where G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] is a weighted voting game, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} \ {i}.
Question: If i annexes S to form a new game G&(S∪{i}), is ϕ&(S∪{i})(G&(S∪{i})) > ϕi(G)?
We can easily adapt these definitions for the Banzhaf index; we will refer to the result-
ing problems as Beneficial-BI-Merge and Beneficial-BI-Annexation. We will first
consider the issues related to annexation, followed by the analysis for merging.
7.1 Merging
As in the case of splitting, we expect it to be hard to find a beneficial merge. The following
theorem confirms this intuition.
Theorem 17. Beneficial-SS-Merge and Beneficial-BI-Merge are NP-hard.
Proof. Given an instance of Partition A = {a1, . . . , ak}, we construct a weighted voting
game G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] with n = k + 3 players as follows. We set X = 4
∑k
i=1 ai and let
wi = 8ai for i = 1, . . . , n − 3, wn−2 = wn−1 = wn = 1, and q = X + 2. We will now argue
that A is a “yes”-instance of Partition if and only if (G, {n− 1, n}) is a “yes”-instance of
both Beneficial-SS-Merge and Beneficial-BI-Merge.
If A is a “no”-instance of Partition, then by Lemma 10 players n and n − 1 are
dummies, and even if they merge together, the new player &{n − 1, n} remains a dummy
in the new game G&{n−1,n}. Thus, in this case (G, {n − 1, n}) is a “no”-instance for both
of our problems.
Now let us assume that A is a “yes”-instance of Partition. We will first consider the
case of the Shapley–Shubik index, followed by the analysis for the Banzhaf index.
Set N0 = {1, . . . , n − 3}. Let 〈P1, P2〉 be a partition of A, and let 〈S,N0 \ S〉 be the
corresponding partition of N0. Set s = |S|, so |N0 \ S| = n− s− 3. Player n is critical for
S ∪ {n− 2} and S ∪ {n− 1}, as well as for (N0 \S)∪ {n− 2} and (N0 \S)∪ {n− 1}. Thus,
for each partition P = 〈P1, P2〉, where |P1| = s, we have exactly 4(s+1)!(n−2−s)! distinct
permutations where n is critical. Further, it is easy to see that n is not critical for any other
permutation. By symmetry, the same is true for n− 1. Thus, each partition 〈P1, P2〉 of A
with |P1| = s contributes 8 (s+1)!(n−2−s)!n! to the sum of the Shapley–Shubik indices of n− 1
and n.
Now, consider the game G&{n−1,n}. Consider a partition 〈S,N0 \S〉 of N0 with |S0| = s
that corresponds to a partition 〈P1, P2〉 of A. Player &{n − 1, n} is critical for S and
S ∪ {n − 2}, as well as for N0 \ S and (N0 \ S) ∪ {n − 2}. Thus, each partition 〈P1, P2〉
of A with |P1| = s contributes 2 s!(n−2−s)!(n−1)! + 2 (s+1)!(n−3−s)!(n−1)! to the Shapley–Shubik index of
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&{n− 1, n}. It remains to show that
8
(s + 1)!(n− 2− s)!
n!
< 2
s!(n− 2− s)!
(n− 1)! + 2
(s + 1)!(n− 3− s)!
(n− 1)! .
This inequality can be simplified to 4(s + 1)(n− 2− s) < n(n− 2− s + s + 1) = n(n− 1),
which is equivalent to 0 < n(n − 1) − 4(s + 1)(n − 2 − s) = (n − 2s − 3)2 + n − 1. This
inequality clearly holds for n ≥ 1. Hence, ϕn−1(G) + ϕn(G) < ϕ&{n−1,n}(G&{n−1,n}), i.e.,
(G, {n− 1, n}) is a “yes”-instance of Beneficial-SS-Merge if and only if we started with
a “yes”-instance of Partition.
We will now show that the same is true for the Banzhaf index. Let x denote the number
of coalitions in N0 of weight 4X. Then ηn−2(G) = ηn−1(G) = ηn(G) = 2x. For i = 1, . . . , k,
let
Si = {S ⊆ N0 \ {i} | w(S) < 4X,w(S) + wi ≥ q},
and set yi = |Si|. Also, set y =
∑k
i=1 yi.
Consider a player i ∈ N0. Observe that exactly half of the x subsets of N0 of weight 4X
contain i. For any such set T , player i is pivotal for (T \{i})∪{n−2, n−1}, (T \{i})∪{n−
2, n}, (T \{i})∪{n−1, n}, and (T \{i})∪{n−2, n−1, n}. Further, for any coalition S ∈ Si,
player i is pivotal for any coalition of the form S∪S′, where S′ ⊆ {n−2, n−1, n}. Therefore
for any i ∈ N0 we have ηi(G) = 4x2 + 8yi. Thus, we have βn−1(G) = βn(G) = 2x6x+2kx+8y .
In the new game G&{n−1,n}, we have η&{n−1,n}(G&{n−1,n}) = 2x, but ηn−2(G&{n−1,n}) =
0. Now, consider a player i ∈ N0 and a coalition T ⊂ N0 of weight 4X that contains i.
Player i is pivotal for (T \ {i}) ∪ {&{n− 1, n}} and for (T \ {i}) ∪ {n− 2,&{n− 1, n}}. as
well as for any coalition of the form S ∪ S′, where S ∈ Si and S′ ⊆ {n − 2,&{n − 1, n}}.
Hence, ηi(G&{n−1,n}) = 2x2 + 4yi.
We obtain
β&{n−1,n}(G&{n−1,n}) =
2x
2x + kx + 4y
>
4x
6x + 2kx + 8y
= βn−1(G) + βn(G).
Thus, (G, {n−1, n}) is a “yes”-instance of Beneficial-BI-Merge if and only if we started
with a “yes”-instance of Partition.
7.2 Annexation
Felsenthal and Machover (1998) prove that annexation is never disadvantageous with respect
to the Shapley–Shubik index. For completeness, we give a simple proof of this fact.
Proposition 18. For any weighted voting game G with the set of players N , any i ∈ N ,
and any S ⊆ N \ {i} we have ϕi(G) ≤ ϕ&(S∪{i})(G&(S∪{i})).
Proof. We give a proof for the case |S| = 1, i.e., S = {j} for some j ∈ N \ {i}; the general
case follows easily by induction. Let Πi be the set of all permutations π of N such that i
is critical for π in G; we have ϕi(G) = |Πi|/n!. For each π ∈ Πi, let f(π) be a permutation
of the players in N&{i,j} obtained from π by deleting j and replacing i with a new player
&{i, j}. For any π ∈ Πi the player &{i, j} is pivotal for f(π). Moreover, for any permutation
σ of N&{i,j} we have |f−1(σ)| = n. Hence, we have
ϕ&{i,j}(G&{i,j}) ≥
|{f(π) | π ∈ Π}|
(n− 1)! =
|Π|/n
(n− 1)! = ϕi(G).
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However Felsenthal and Machover (1998) show that, for the case of the Banzhaf index,
annexation could be disadvantageous; they refer to this phenomenon as the Bloc Paradox.
They provide a 13-player WVG for which this is the case, which is the simplest example they
could find. We improve on their result by describing a 7-player WVG where annexation is
disadvantageous.
Example 19. Consider a weighted voting game [11; 6, 5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]. In this game, player 1
is pivotal for any coalition that involves player 2 and any subset of the remaining players, as
well as for the coalition {3, . . . , 7}, i.e., for 33 coalitions. Player 2 is pivotal for any coalition
that involves player 1 and at most 4 of the remaining players, i.e., 31 coalitions. Finally, each
of the players of weight 1 is only pivotal for the coalition that includes player 1 and the rest
of the players of weight 1. Thus, the Banzhaf index of player 1 equals 3333+31+5 ≈ 0.47826.
If player 1 annexes one of the players with weight 1, the new game is [11; 7, 5, 1, 1, 1, 1].
Applying the same reasoning as above, we obtain that player 1 is pivotal for 17 coalitions,
player 2 is pivotal for 15 coalition, and each of the remaining players is pivotal for exactly one
coalition, so the Banzhaf index of player 1 in the new game is 1717+15+4 ≈ 0.47222 < 0.47826.
We have shown that annexation can be disadvantageous in the case of the Banzhaf
index. One would at least expect that the Banzhaf index payoff after annexing another
player is monotone in the power of the annexed player. Surprisingly, this is not the case.
That is, we will now show that there exists a weighted voting game G = [q;w1, . . . , wn]
and i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that wj > wk, but β&{i,j}(G&{i,j}) < β&{i,k}(G&{i,k}). We will
refer to this phenomenon as the Annexation Non-monotonicity Paradox. Observe that it is
distinct from the Bloc Paradox: the former has to do with choosing which of the two given
players to annex, while the latter has to do with choosing between annexing a given player
and not annexing any player at all.
Example 20. Consider the weighted voting game [9; 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1]. Suppose first that player
1 annexes player 2 to form the game [9; 6, 2, 1, 1, 1]. In this game, player 1 is pivotal for
1 coalition that does not include player 2, and 7 coalitions that include player 2, i.e., 8
coalitions. Further, player 2 is pivotal for 6 coalitions, and each of the remaining players is
pivotal for 2 coalitions. Thus, the Banzhaf index of player 1 is 88+6+6 = 0.4.
Now, suppose that player 1 annexes player 3 to form the game [9; 5, 3, 1, 1, 1]. In this
game, player 1 is pivotal for 7 coalitions, player 2 is pivotal for 7 coalitions, and each of
the remaining players is pivotal for 1 coalition. Thus, the Banzhaf index of player 1 in this
game is 77+7+3 ≈ 0.411765 > 0.4.
In contrast, the Shapley–Shubik index is monotone with respect to annexation.
Proposition 21. For any weighted voting game G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] and any i, j, k ∈
{1, . . . , n} such that wj ≥ wk we have ϕ&{i,j}(G&{i,j}) ≥ ϕ&{i,k}(G&{i,k}).
Proof. Consider any permutation π of N&{i,k} for which &{i, k} is pivotal. Let π′ be a
permutation of N&{i,j} obtained by replacing &{i, k} with &{i, j} and j with k. Since
w&{i,j} ≥ w&{i,k}, if in π player j appears after player &{i, k}, then player &{i, j} is
pivotal for π′. On the other hand, if in π player j appears before player &{i, k}, we
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have w(Sπ′(&{i, j})) ≤ w(Sπ(&{i, k})) < q, w(Sπ′(&{i, j}) ∪ {&{i, j}}) = w(Sπ(&{i, k}) ∪
{&{i, k}}) ≥ q, so &{i, j} is pivotal for π′ in this case as well. Hence, each permutation for
which &{i, k} is pivotal corresponds to a distinct permutation for which &{i, j} is pivotal,
i.e., we have ϕ&{i,j}(G&{i,j}) ≥ ϕ&{i,k}(G&{i,k}).
To bound the gains and losses from annexation, we observe that a player can increase
his payoff (with respect to both indices) by as much as 1. This happens if a dummy
player annexes a sufficiently large player or a coalition of players. On the other hand,
Theorem 7 immediately implies that, when a player i annexes a player j in a game G, we
have β&{i,j}(G&{i,j}) ≥ 12(βi(G) + βj(G)). This has the following useful corollary.
Corollary 22. For any weighted voting game G with the set of players N and any i, j ∈ N
we have β&{i,j}(G&{i,j}) ≥ 12βi(G), i.e., no player can decrease his payoff by more than a
factor of 2 by annexing another player. Moreover, if wi ≤ wj, then β&{i,j}(G&{i,j}) ≥ βi(G),
We will now show that determining whether a player can benefit from annexing a given
coalition (with respect to the Banzhaf index) is NP-hard.
Theorem 23. Beneficial-BI-Annexation is NP-hard.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 11. Given an instance of Partition A =
{a1, . . . , ak}, we construct a weighted voting game G = [q;w1, . . . , wn] with n = k+2 players
as follows. We let X =
∑
ai∈A ai, and set wi = 8ai for i = 1, . . . , n− 2, wn−1 = wn = 1 and
q = 4X + 2.
By Lemma 10, if A is a “no”-instance of Partition, then players n − 1 and n are
dummies, and n remains a dummy even if it annexes n − 1. Now, suppose that A is a
“yes”-instance of Partition. Let x denote the number of coalitions in N \ {n − 1, n} of
weight 4X. We have ηn−1 = ηn(G) = x. For i = 1, . . . , n− 2, let
Si = {S ⊆ N \ {n− 1, n, i} | w(S) < 4X,w(S) + wi ≥ q},
and set yi = |Si|. Also, set y =
∑n−2
i=1 yi.
The calculations in the proof of Theorem 11 show that
βn(G) = x2x+(n−2)x
2
+4y ,
β&{n,n−1}(G&{n,n−1}) = xx+(n−2)x
2
+2y .
Since x > 0, this implies βn(G) < β&{n,n−1}(G&{n,n−1}). Hence, (G, {n − 1}, n) is a
“yes”-instance of Beneficial-BI-Annexation if and only if we have started with a “yes”-
instance of Partition.
We conclude this section by analyzing the benefits of merging and annexation in una-
nimity games, i.e., games where q = w(N).
Proposition 24. In any unanimity game, it is advantageous for a player to annex an
arbitrary coalition, with respect to both the Shapley–Shubik index and the Banzhaf index.
However, no group of players can increase its total payoff (as measured by either of the
indices) by merging.
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Proof. In any game all players have equal value of the index both before and after annexa-
tion. Hence, if i annexes a coalition of size s, his power increases from 1n to
1
n−s . However,
merging reduces the total power of all players in a coalition of size s from sn to
1
n−s .
We remark that Proposition 24 generalizes to any game in which each player is a veto
player.
8. Empirical Analysis
We now analyze false-name splitting manipulations empirically. We have constructed a
system for randomly constructing weighted voting games and examined the changes in both
the Shapley–Shubik index and the Banzhaf index that occur when agents split their weights
between false identities. We briefly describe our simulation system, the game construction
and the power index calculations, and then present the empirical evidence obtained.
8.1 Simulation System and Settings
The weighted voting games were constructed by first randomly choosing the number of
players in the game. Then, the weights of the players were each drawn from N(μ, σ2),
the normal distribution with mean μ and variance σ2. The weights were then rounded to
the nearest integer, to make sure that the game has integer weights. The threshold for
the game was chosen uniformly at random between 0 and the sum of the players’ weights
w = w(N), and again rounded to the nearest integer. In our experiments, we have used a
mean of μ = 200 for the weights, and several values for the standard deviation σ from the
set {5, 10, 15, . . . , 50}. The number of players n was chosen uniformly at random from the
set {5, 6, 7, . . . , 24}.
Power indices are computationally hard to compute exactly (Papadimitriou & Yan-
nakakis, 1994; Matsui & Matsui, 2001), but can be tractably approximated using several
methods. We have used the approximation method of Bachrach et al. (2010). This algo-
rithm estimates the power indices and returns a result which is probably approximately
correct, as discussed in Section 6. Given a game in which a player’s true power index is
ψ, and given a target accuracy level  and confidence level δ, the algorithm returns an
approximation ψˆ such that with probability at least 1 − δ we have |ψ − ψˆ| ≤  (i.e. the
result is approximately correct, and is within a distance  of the correct value). This al-
gorithm works by drawing a sample of k permutations (or coalitions), and testing whether
the target player is critical for them. Such a test runs in time linear in the number of
agents, so the total running time is O(kn logW ). Bachrach et al. show that to achieve
a confidence level δ and accuracy level , it suffices to take k = ln(2/δ)/(22). Thus the
total running time is logarithmic in the confidence and quadratic in the accuracy, so the
approach is tractable even for high accuracy and confidence. We have used δ = 0.00001
and  = 0.001, so the power was estimated very accurately. Our system was implemented
in C#, and the results of the experiments were stored in an SQL database. Since power
indices were approximated accurately, a single experiment can take several seconds. Our
tests required tens of thousands of experiments, so we have used a compute cluster with
250 cores for our experiments.
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Our theoretical results show that testing for a beneficial split is hard, which might create
the impression that finding a beneficial manipulation is hard in practice. Our empirical
experiments were designed to see whether this is indeed the case. A very naive method
that a manipulator can use is to try many possible splits into two identities, in constant
intervals. In other words a manipulator whose weight is w can try s2 splits by splitting his
weight as (ws , w − ws ), (2ws , w − 2ws ), (3ws , w − 3ws ) and so on. Although this is certainly
not a complete coverage of the space of possible manipulations, in our experiments we have
tried a very simple algorithm that is based on this idea. Since all the weights were integers,
we have only tried splitting weights between two false identities, and examined all integer
splits. For example, if an agent had a weight of wi = 10, we attempted splitting into weights
of w′1 = 9, w′′1 = 1, w′1 = 8, w′′1 = 2, w′1 = 7, w′′1 = 3 and so on. In each experiment we
have recorded the details of the game, the number of beneficial splits (power increase) and
harmful splits (power decrease). For a split to be considered beneficial, it had to increase the
power by more than twice the accuracy level. Thus, the results presented here understate
the number of positive splits. In our results we examine the proportion of experiments
where we have found at least one beneficial manipulation, as well as the proportion of the
splits that were beneficial (out of all the integer splits).
8.2 Empirical Results
We first present the results regarding the Shapley–Shubik index. First and foremost, our
results indicate that the weighted voting domain is very manipulable, at least for our method
of generating random weighted voting games. Under all values we have tried for the variance
in the player weights and number of players in the game, in over 95.5% of the experiments
even the very naive manipulation algorithm managed to uncover at least one beneficial
manipulation. This indicates that in most games it is enough to try all integer splits (or
splits in uniform intervals) and use the tractable method for approximating power indices to
uncover beneficial manipulations. Figures 2 and 3 indicate the proportion of the experiments
in which this algorithm succeeds in finding a beneficial split, as a function of the variance
in players’ weights and the number of players, respectively. It appears that the success rate
of our algorithm slightly increases as the variance increases. No such obvious trend appears
for the number of players.
One might be tempted to think that beneficial splits are quite common, as most exper-
iments had at least one beneficial split. However, it turns out that most splits are harmful
splits. In all tested settings, less than 40% of all splits were beneficial splits. In most
settings, harmful splits accounted for over 70% of all splits. In Figure 4 and Figure 5, we
indicate the proportion of beneficial splits, as a function of the variance in players’ weights
and the number of players, respectively.
We have also examined the distribution of the proportion of beneficial splits across
experiments. In some generated games, the beneficial splits were quite rare, and less than a
single percent of the splits were beneficial. In other generated games, beneficial splits were
the common case, and over 99% of the splits were beneficial. Figure 6 shows the distribution
(histogram) of the proportion of beneficial splits, across games. To create the figure, the
games were partitioned into 200 bins, according to the proportion of beneficial splits in the
game. Each bin was of size 0.5% (e.g., the proportion of beneficial manipulations in the
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Figure 2: Proportion of experiments where the naive algorithm finds a beneficial split for
different variances of players’ weights (Shapley–Shubik index)
Figure 3: Proportion of experiments where the naive algorithm finds a beneficial split for
different numbers of players (Shapley–Shubik index)
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Figure 4: Proportion of beneficial splits for different variances of players’ weights (Shapley–
Shubik index)
Figure 5: Proportion of beneficial splits for different numbers of players (Shapley–Shubik
index)
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Figure 6: Distribution (histogram) of the proportion of positive splits across games
(Shapley–Shubik index)
100-th bin was between 0.5 and 0.55). The value on the X axis of Figure 6 is the proportion
of beneficial splits (the bin), and the Y axis is the number of experiments falling in that
category. Figure 6 shows that most games are ones where beneficial splits are more rare
than harmful splits, but the distribution has a long tail, so even games where almost all the
splits are beneficial are not uncommon.
We now turn to examine the Banzhaf index. As in the case of the Shapley–Shubik index,
for the Banzhaf index the weighted voting domain is very susceptible to manipulation.
Under all tested settings, in over 92.5% of the experiments our manipulation algorithm
managed to uncover at least one beneficial manipulation (slightly less than the 95.5% for
the Shapley–Shubik index). The proportion of experiments where our algorithm finds a
beneficial split with respect to the Banzhaf index is shown in Figure 7 (for different values
of variance) and Figure 8 (for different number of players).
Similarly to the case of the Shapley–Shubik index, for the Banzhaf index beneficial splits
were the less common case, and most splits are harmful splits, with less than 45% of all
splits being beneficial, and typically about 40% being beneficial splits (slightly higher than
for the Shapley–Shubik index). Unlike for the Shapley–Shubik index, for the Banzhaf index,
the proportion of beneficial splits among all splits increases with the variance (Figure 9).
However, this proportion does not have a clear trend with regard to the number of players
(Figure 10).
The distribution of the proportion of beneficial splits across games for the Banzhaf index
seems quite similar to that for the Shapley–Shubik index (see Figure 11). Again, for most
games, the majority of splits are harmful, but the distribution has a long tail, and many
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Figure 7: Proportion of experiments where the naive algorithm finds a beneficial split for
different variances of players’ weights (Banzhaf index)
Figure 8: Proportion of experiments where the naive algorithm finds a beneficial split for
different numbers of players (Banzhaf index)
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Figure 9: Proportion of beneficial splits for different variances of players’ weights (Banzhaf
index)
Figure 10: Proportion of beneficial splits for different numbers of players (Banzhaf index)
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Figure 11: Distribution (histogram) of the proportion of positive splits across games
(Banzhaf index)
games have mostly beneficial splits. Although the distribution seems similar to that for the
Shapley–Shubik index, the tail of the distribution seems slightly “fatter” for the Banzhaf
index.
To conclude, experiments for both indices present a similar picture. For most games
generated in our model, we have mostly harmful splits. However, many experiments have
many positive splits, and in some of them even almost all the splits are beneficial. Games
where trying all the integer splits does not yield a successful manipulation are very rare,
although they do exist. Thus, for most games generated in our model, even the extremely
simple manipulation algorithm finds beneficial splits. We conclude that despite the hardness
results in this paper, in practice we believe it is quite easy to find such splits, and thus we
believe such attacks pose a real problem in many settings.
9. Splitting into More Than Two Identities
So far, we have mostly discussed the gain (or loss) that a player can achieve by splitting
into two identities. However, it is also possible for a player to use three or more false names.
Potentially, the number of identities a player can use can be as large as his weight (and if the
weights are not required to be integers, it can even be infinite). It would be interesting to see
which of our results hold in this more general setting. For example, while our computational
hardness result holds for splits into any number of identities, the algorithmic results of the
previous section only apply to splits into a constant number of new identities. An obvious
open problem here is to design a pseudopolynomial algorithm for finding a beneficial integer
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split into any number of identities, or to prove that this problem is NP-hard even for small
weights (i.e., weights that are polynomial in n). Another question of interest here is to
extend the upper and lower bounds of Section 4 for this setting.
One might think that finding a beneficial split into k ≥ 2 identities is easier than finding
one that uses exactly two identities: after all, any two-way split can be transformed into a
split into three or more players in which only two players have non-zero weight. However,
it turns out that if we restrict our attention to non-trivial splits, i.e., one in which all of the
new players have a non-zero weight, this is no longer the case.
Example 25. Consider a game G = [6; 5, 5]. In this game, the only winning coalition
includes both players, so their Shapley–Shubik indices are given by ϕ1(G) = ϕ2(G) = 1/2.
Suppose that player 2 splits into two identities 2′ and 2′′. For any selection of integer
weights w′2 > 0, w′′2 > 0 that satisfy w′2 + w′′2 = 5, in the new game G′ = [6; 5, w′2, w′′2 ] we
have ϕ2′(G′) = ϕ2′′(G′) = 1/3. Indeed, in this game each player is pivotal in a permutation
π if and only if it occurs in the second position, which happens with probability 1/3. Hence,
any non-trivial split into two identities increases the payoff of the second player by a factor
of (2/3)/(1/2) = 4/3.
Now, suppose that the second player splits into 5 new players of weight 1 each. In the
new game, player 1 is pivotal for a permutation π if and only if he does not occur in the
first position in that permutation, so his Shapley–Shubik index is 5/6. Consequently, the
sum of Shapley–Shubik indices of all remaining players (i.e., the new identities of player 2)
is 1/6. Therefore, this split decreases the payoff of player 2 by a factor of 3. To summarize,
while any non-trivial integer split into 2 identities is beneficial for player 2, any integer split
into 5 identities with positive weight is harmful for him.
Remark 26. Example 25 can be generalized to games of the form GN = [N + 1;N,N ] for
an arbitrary integer N > 0. The reasoning above shows that if one of the players decides
to split into N new players of weight 1 each, this increases the Shapley–Shubik index of the
other player to N/(N + 1) and hence decreases the total payoff of the splitting player by
a factor of (N + 1)/2. As the representation size of this game is polynomial in logN , this
decrease is exponential in description size.
10. Conclusions
We have considered false-name manipulations in weighted voting games with respect to the
payoff schemes based on the Shapley–Shubik index and the Banzhaf index. We have also
considered manipulation via annexation and voluntary merging with respect to such payoff
schemes. We have examined both the limits of manipulation (Table 1) and the complexity
of manipulation (Table 2), and complemented the theoretical investigation by empirical
analysis.
We have shown that, in most scenarios considered in this paper, testing whether a
beneficial manipulation exists is NP-hard. One may ask whether these hardness results
provide an adequate barrier to manipulation, given that the power indices themselves are
hard to compute. In other words, don’t we simultaneously assume that the weights are small
(and hence computing the indices is easy) and large (and hence manipulation is hard)? To
resolve this apparent contradiction, note that the power indices considered in this paper
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Bounds Reference
2
n+1ϕi(G) ≤ ϕi′(G′) + ϕi′′(G′) ≤ 2nn+1ϕi(G) Theorems 5 and 6
ϕi(G) ≤ ϕi(G&({i}∪S)) ≤ 1. Proposition 18
1
n+1βi(G) ≤ βi′(G′) + βi′′(G′) ≤ 2βi(G) Theorems 7 and 8
βi(G)
2 ≤ βi(G&({i,j})) ≤ 1. Corollary 22
Table 1: Bounds on effects of false-name manipulations in WVGs
Banzhaf index Shapley–Shubik index
Splitting NP-hard NP-hard
Merging NP-hard NP-hard
Annexation NP-hard advantageous∗
Splitting in unanimity game advantageous advantageous
Merging in unanimity game disadvantageous disadvantageous
Annexation in unanimity game advantageous advantageous
∗(Felsenthal & Machover, 1998)
Table 2: Complexity of false-name manipulations in WVGs
correspond to the voting power, and the players may try to increase their voting power by
weight-splitting manipulation even if they cannot compute it. Also, when a power index is
used to compute payments, the center, which performs this computation, may have more
computational power than individual players.
Our experimental results show that, for moderately large weights, weight-splitting ma-
nipulation is easy in practice. However, our algorithm relies on considering all integer splits,
i.e., its running time is at least linear in the manipulator’s weight. An interesting open ques-
tion is whether it is the case that if a beneficial split exists, it can be found by testing a
number of splits that is logarithmic in the manipulator’s weight.
Our results indicate that the Shapley–Shubik index and the Banzhaf index behave sim-
ilarly with respect to false-name manipulation; however, the Shapley–Shubik index appears
to be a more desirable solution concept because annexation does not decrease the payoff of
a player. Exploring other solution concepts and their behavior with respect to false-name
manipulation is a natural next step; a particularly suitable solution to consider could be
the nucleolus, which not only always exists but is also unique.
The study of weighted voting has many applications, both in political science and in
multiagent systems. There are several possible interpretations for identity-splitting in these
contexts, such as obtaining a higher share of the grand coalition’s gains when these are
distributed according to the Shapley–Shubik index or the Banzhaf index, or obtaining more
political power by splitting a political party into several parties with similar political plat-
forms. In the first case, a false-name manipulation is hard to detect in open anonymous
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environments, and can thus be very effective. In the second case, the manipulation is done
using legitimate tools of political conduct. Therefore, we conjecture that false-name ma-
nipulation is widespread in the real world and may become a serious issue in multiagent
systems. It is therefore important to develop a better understanding of the effects of this
behavior and/or design methods of preventing it.
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